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Abstract
This paper argues that corruption in developing countries has deep
historical roots; going all the way back to the characteristics of their
colonial experience. The degree of European settlement during colonial
times is used to di¤erentiate between types of colonial experience, and
is found to be a powerful explanatory factor of present-day corruption
levels. The relationship is non-linear, as higher levels of European set-
tlement resulted in more powerful elites (and more corruption) only as
long as Europeans remained a minority group in the total population.
1 Introduction
This paper sits at the intersection of two empirical literatures that over
the last fteen years have greatly advanced our understanding of develop-
ing countries. We are talking about the literature on the determinants of
corruption and the literature on the socioeconomic consequences of colonial-
ism.1
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1Lambsdor¤ (2006) and Treisman (2007) provide useful surveys of the corruption liter-
ature. Important contributions are Mauro (1995), Ades and Di Tella (1997), La Porta et
al. (1999) and Treisman (2000). Among the many contributions to the literature on the
socio-economic consequences of colonialism we can mention La Porta et al. (1997, 1998),
Acemoglu et al. (2001), Glaeser et al. (2004), Angeles (2007) and Angeles and Neanidis
(2009). See also the survey by Nunn (2009).
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The literature on the empirical determinants of corruption has grown
exponentially since its beginnings in the mid-90s, when the rst measures
of the perception of corruption were made available and international aid
donors like the World Bank named ghting corruption a policy priority.2
Although much has been learned since then, the literature has always been
challenged by the di¢ culty of establishing causality.
Causality is di¢ cult to establish because many of the explanatory fac-
tors analyzed in the literature could plausibly be a¤ected by corruption.
To name but two examples, Brunetti and Weder (2003) argue that press
freedom will deter corruption while Swamy et al. (2001) and Dollar et al.
(2001) propose that a larger share of women in government will also lower
corruption levels. In both cases one could well argue for the reverse e¤ect,
with corrupt governments constraining the press and limiting the access of
women to government. Of course, these problems are well recognized in the
literature; but convincing solutions are rare due to the di¢ culty of nding
appropriate instruments.
The literature has also established a signicant set of exogenous, histor-
ically determined variables, that have a potential e¤ect on corruption. The
most important variables in this set are the legal origins of the country, the
religions professed by its population, the degree of ethnic fractionalization,
and the identity of the colonial power formerly established in its territory
(if the country was colonized). Since all of these variables are determined
by events that took place in the distant past, they are credible sources of
exogenous variation to explain current levels of corruption.
It is thus the case that colonial heritage is well established as a potential
determinant of corruption. The most careful analysis of this link is proba-
bly found in Treisman (2000), who nds that former British colonies have
2The World Banks World Development Report (1997) is devoted to how bureaucratic
corruption leads to bad policies, while the relationship between corruption and aid is
addressed in World Bank (1989, 1998).
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signicantly lower levels of corruption.3 No similar e¤ect is found for former
colonies of other European nations and - perhaps surprisingly - the simple
fact of having been colonized appears to be unrelated to current levels of
corruption. Until now the literature has not analyzed the degree or intensity
of the colonial experience; a point that will be developed below.
The most powerful explanatory factor of corruption measures is the level
of economic development as measured by GDP per capita. Current levels
of GDP per capita typically show correlation coe¢ cients with measures of
corruption in the region of 0:8 (Treisman 2007, p. 223) and explain much of
the variation in the data. The problem with this relationship is that reverse
causality is evidently suspect. We may note, however, that tests carried out
instrumenting for GDP per capita with geographical or historical variables
typically do not a¤ect the results (Treisman 2000, 2007).
Turning to the literature on the socioeconomic consequences of colonial-
ism, a large number of papers have stressed the long term e¤ects of colo-
nialism on institutional quality and economic development (Hall and Jones
1999, Acemoglu et al. 2001, 2002, Rodrik et al. 2004), on company law
and the administration of justice (La Porta et al. 1997, 1998), on income
inequality (Angeles 2007) and on aid e¤ectiveness (Angeles and Neanidis
2009). It seems clear that the current situation of most developing nations
is, if not historically determined, at least heavily path-dependent.
In much of this recent literature on the consequences of colonialism an
important consideration is the type of colonial experience. While this can
be potentially measured along di¤erent dimensions, an aspect that has at-
tracted much attention is the degree of European settlement in their colonies.
Some countries experienced very modest inows of European settlers (most
3Treisman (2000) adds that This is not due to greater openness to trade or democracy,
and is probably not explained by Protestant or Anglican religious traditions. It may
reect greater protections against o¢ cial abuse provided by common law legal systems.
But slightly stronger evidence suggests that it is due to superior administration of justice
in these countries(p. 426-427).
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of sub-saharan Africa, India), others experienced large inows with Euro-
peans becoming a sizeable share of the population (Latin America, South
Africa) and others, nally, experienced large inows with Europeans becom-
ing the majority of the population (United States, Canada, Australia and
New Zealand).
In Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002) the degree of European settlement is
considered a positive determinant of institutional quality. Where Europeans
settled in large numbers, it is argued, they established institutions that pro-
tected property rights; while countries where Europeans were but a minority
saw the creation of extractiveinstitutions.
In Angeles (2007) and Angeles and Neanidis (2009) the relationship be-
tween European settlement and the variable of interest is non-linear. Angeles
(2007) argues that the di¤erence in income between European settlers and
the rest of the population implies a positive relationship between the degree
of European settlement and income inequality as long as Europeans remain
a minority. Countries where Europeans became the majority of the popula-
tion would be characterized by lower inequality. The point is taken forward
by Angeles and Neanidis (2009), who argue for a non-linear relationship be-
tween European settlement and the power and attitudes of the local elite
which is then reected in the way that foreign aid ows are used.
This paper follows the same line as Angeles (2007) and Angeles and
Neanidis (2009), and argues that a non-linear relationship exists between
the degree of European settlement in colonial times and current levels of
corruption around the world. As in Angeles and Neanidis (2009), we con-
sider that the key element to understand this link is the characteristics of the
local elite. A larger degree of European settlement implies a more powerful
elite, as the control of these settlers over the countrys resources increases
and the capacity of the rest of the population to present a credible opposi-
tion diminishes. This, however, holds only as long as Europeans represent
a minority of the population. For countries with a European majority a
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credible force appears to counteract the power of the elite, namely those
same European settlers who now constitute most of the population.
As an example of how elite power initially increases with the share of
Europeans in the population, consider the di¤erence in land policy between
two British colonies in Africa: Nigeria and South Africa. In Nigeria, where
European settlement was very limited and Britains interest lay in the expan-
sion of the production of cash crops such as cotton, cocoa, groundnuts and
palm oil, a 1917 law forbid the acquisition of land by Europeans. In South
Africa, where European settlers were a sizeable part of the population and
had the means to impose their interests, a 1913 law forbid the acquisition
of land by Africans outside some strictly delimited reserves constituting
8% of the countrys territory. The di¤erence was not due to the identity of
the colonial power, which was Britain in both cases, but to the degree of
European settlement.
An aspect of most colonial experiences that is sometimes overlooked
is the fact that European governments had often a relatively benevolent
approach towards their extra-European subjects and did not wish their ruin.
Whether this was guided by self-interest or by loftier motives is di¢ cult to
establish; but self-interest was at least part of the story: taxes and cash crop
production would be higher if the natives are allowed to progress. The reason
why actual policies in the colonies were nevertheless highly detrimental to
the native population is that the wishes of European governments were in
opposition to those in charge of implementing them, namely the European
settlers.
European settlers and the autochthonous population were typically in
competition for the countriesbest lands, mining resources and commercial
concessions. This was an unequal contest which European settlers, provided
that there was more than a handful of them, could easily win. European
governments were often reticent to see these settlers becoming more pow-
erful, taking a larger share of colonial production for their own use and
potentially challenging the metropolisauthority. But their capacity to do
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something about it was in inverse proportion to the number and strength of
the settlers.
A clear example of this is the repeated attempts of the Spanish crown
to eliminate the encomienda system in its American colonies. This system
granted its beneciaries the right to extract tribute - usually under the form
of labor - from the Indian population of a given region. An encomienda was
a highly-sought reward for the early conquistadors of the Aztec and Inca
empires. The large abuses to which the system gave place lead the Crown
to attempt its regulation and demise from the early days of the Spanish
Empire. A rst attempt, the Laws of Burgos (1512), regulated the treatment
of Indian workers and was largely ignored. A second, more forceful attempt,
came in 1542 with the approval of the New Laws of the Indies. These laws
prohibited the enslavement of Indians, regulated tribute and declared that
existing encomiendas would pass to the Crown at the death of the holder.
The ensuing protests and revolts forced the Crown to retreat and pursue a
less ambitious target. Encomiendas continued to operate for some time and
eventually mutated into the large haciendas that characterize much of Latin
America up to the present.4
But the degree of European settlement and the power of the local elite
are positively related only as long as the European component of the pop-
ulation remains a minority. In the four cases were Europeans became the
majority of the population, the so-called New Europes comprising the
United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, the relationship breaks
down. These colonies were characterized by a much less unequal distribution
of land and political power and, correspondingly, by a less powerful elite.
Overall then, the relationship between European settlement and elite power
was non-linear.
The link between the above description of the colonial experience and
current corruption levels is straightforward. Corruption will be highest in
societies where the elite is powerful and has little regard for the well-being
4For more on the encomienda system see Keen and Wasserman (1988).
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of the rest of the population. The rst condition implies that members of
the elite will be able to embezzle funds without much fear of punishment
and the second condition implies that they will have little remorse in doing
so. Both conditions are met in former colonial countries where European
settlers constitute a large share of the population but still remain a minority.
As we have argued above, these countries will be characterized by large
inequalities in economic and political power between the European elite and
the indigenous population. In addition to this, the ethnic di¤erences between
the elite and the rest of the population is usually accompanied by a mutual
lack of concern for the well-being of the other5. This pattern perpetuated
itself up to the present through institutional persistence given that change
was not in the interest of those in power (Engerman and Sokolo¤ 1997,
Acemoglu et al. 2001).
The central thesis that this paper advances is then that the type of
colonial experience has an inuence on present levels of corruption. The
measurable aspect of the colonial experience that allow us to di¤erentiate
among them is the degree of European settlement. We hypothesize that
a larger degree of European settlement will initially be positively related
to corruption; with the relationship turning negative once European settlers
represent a majority of the population. In econometric terms this hypothesis
can be tested by estimating a quadratic relationship between corruption and
degree of settlement.
Before turning to the actual testing of our hypothesis, a few additional
comments are in order. First, our story may provide an explanation for the
unsatisfactory result, mentioned above, that the simple fact of having been
colonized is not related to corruption. As we have argued, only some types
of colonial experiences are unequivocally linked to high corruption levels.
Second, we do not think that Europeans have a natural tendency towards
corruption or that they are on average more corruptible than the rest of
5For evidence of the role of ethnic di¤erences in the willingness to pay for (universally
accesible) public services see Easterly and Levine (1997), Alesina et al. (1999) and Luttmer
(2001).
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humanity. What we do believe is that people, irrespective of their ethnic
background, tend to enter into acts of corruption when they have the chance
to do so without much fear of punishment and when the consequences of
these acts are felt by groups other than their own. Because of historical
reasons Europeans found themselves in such a position in several parts of
the globe, while peoples of other nations rarely did so.6
A third and nal remark concerns the type of corruption that our story
relates to. Since we are talking about the corruption of the governing elites,
our mechanism should apply to high-level corruption; the one that takes
place in ministerial o¢ ces and where the amounts concerned are counted
in millions. Petty corruption, the small payments made to police o¢ cers
and tra¢ c controllers, are not the object here. The point is of importance
because it guides us in the selection of the corruption measures for this
study.
The literature di¤erentiates between measures of perceived corruption,
based on the assessment of experts or business people, and measures of
experienced corruption, based on surveys where people are asked if they
have actually been forced to pay a bribe in the recent past. While perceived
corruption su¤ers from the biases and priors of those asked for an opinion,
they are the only valid option for our purposes. The reason is clear: most or
all of what is captured by the measures of experienced corruption is what we
have termed petty corruption. For the vast majority of people small bribes
is all they will ever experience directly. Large corruption cases are much
more rare in number and their actors have all the incentives to keep them
secret. Despite their imperfections, perceived corruption measures ask about
the overall level of corruption in a country; giving high-level corruption the
preeminent place that it probably deserves. In the remainder of the paper
6We are of course aware that the high ethnic diversity in some developing nations,
particularly in Africa, implies that the people in power will usually belong to a di¤erent
group than the rest of the population. This governing group, however, will usually not
enjoy a dominating position as marked as that enjoyed by European settlers or their
descendants in the countries of high settlement.
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all references to corruption measures will be understood to refer to perceived
corruption measures.
This paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the data
and the empirical methodology to be used. Sections 3 to 5 contain our
econometric results and build up our case through a series of alternative tests
and robustness checks. Section 6, nally, o¤ers some concluding remarks.
2 Data and methodology
The econometric specication that we will employ throughout the paper is
the following:
Ci = + logyi + 1Settlersi + 2(Settlersi)
2 +
P
j
jXji + "i: (1)
In equation (1) Ci is a measure of corruption for country i, yi is GDP
per capita and Xji is a set of additional determinants of corruption. Our
main variable of interest is Settlersi, a measure of the degree of European
settlement in colonial times. This variable is taken from Angeles (2007)
and Angeles and Neanidis (2009) and measures the percentage of European
settlers with respect to total population in colonial times. The variable takes
a value of zero for non-colonized countries. As we described previously, we
expect a non-linear relationship between this variable and corruption; which
is why the econometric specication also includes its square7.
GDP per capita is singled out from the set of variables Xji since it is
usually seen as the most powerful explanatory factor of corruption. GDP
per capita will be present in all our regressions, while the composition of the
Xji set will change.
7The original sources of Settlersi are Etemad (2000) and McEvedy and Jones (1978).
The variable measures European settlers in overseas colonies only (that is, it does not
measure settlement in contiguous territorial conquests that may be classied as colonies
such as the former Soviet Empire).
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We will rst consider as additional explanatory factors of corruption
those variables that can be safely assumed as exogenous: the identity of the
colonial power, the legal origins of the country, religion and ethnic fraction-
alization. After establishing our results with this set of variables we will
continue the analysis incorporating additional variables that have gured in
the literature but may su¤er from endogeneity problems8.
Our baseline measure of corruption is the World Banks control of cor-
ruption index for the year 2005 constructed by Kaufmann et al. (2009). We
will also use alternative measures such as the Transparency International
(TI) corruption index and the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG)
corruption index. All of these are measures of perceived corruption and
they take higher values for better outcomes, i.e. they are actually measur-
ing the absence of corruption. It follows that, according to our thesis, Ci
should rst decrease and then increase with the degree of European settle-
ment. The expected signs of the coe¢ cients of interest are then negative for
1 and positive for 2:
An initial assessment of the relationship between the percentage of Euro-
pean settlers in the population and corruption is given in Figure 1. The top
panel of the gure shows a scatter plot of these two variables for all coun-
tries. Although much variation is observed among countries with a value
of Settlersi equal or close to zero, a U relationship can be perceived for
those countries where European settlement was of considerable magnitude9.
In the lower panel of the gure we present only countries with a value of
Settlersi at or below 30% and observe a fairly clear negative relationship.
The gure provides visual support to our thesis before turning to a formal
empirical analysis. A summary of statistics for the most important variables
in our analysis is provided in Table 1.
8The dataset of these control variables has been
put together by Treisman (2007) and is available at:
http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/faculty/treisman/Pages/publishedpapers.html
9This is a U shaped relationship between European settlement and control of corrup-
tion. It follows that the relationship between European settlement and corruption would
be an inverted U. Both ways of stating the relationship are used in the rest of the paper.
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Our empirical examination uses cross-sectional regressions and not panel
methods since corruption measures are not directly comparable over time,
even when produced by the same agency, due to changes in sources and
methodology (Treisman 2007)10. Weighted least squares (WLS) and two-
stage least squares (2SLS) are employed as alternative econometric method-
ologies.
3 Baseline results
Our baseline results are reported in Table 2. In this table we consider only
historically determined variables and GDP per capita as explanatory factors
of corruption. Our aim is to have a set of results that can be reasonably
assumed to be free of endogeneity problems. As we have noted above, GDP
per capita may well su¤er from reverse causality but we will address this
problem by means of instrumental variables regressions in the subsequent
tables. Because of its importance, GDP per capita gures in all our re-
gressions: estimated coe¢ cients for other variables may su¤er large changes
if GDP per capita was to be omitted. We use weighted least squares and
weight countries by the inverse of their standard errors. This allows us to
place less emphasis on cases where perceived corruption is measured with
less precision11.
The rst column of table 2 starts by using GDP per capita and our
regressors of interest, Settlers and its square, as the sole explanatory factors.
The results are supportive of our story. As expected, GDP per capita has a
large, positive and statistically signicant e¤ect on the absence of corruption:
richer countries are usually perceived as less corrupt. But the degree of
European settlement from colonial times is also producing a statistically
signicant e¤ect and this e¤ect has the expected U pattern. As hypothesized,
10Kaufmann and Kraay (2002) show that for the World Bank index of control of cor-
ruption about half the variance over time results from changes in the sources used and
their respective assigned weights.
11We have also run our regressions with ordinary least squares and, as expected, WLS
produces more precise estimates.
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a higher degree of European settlers is associated with more corruption but
only up to a certain level. The turning point, which is given in the last line
of the table, is reached when the percentage of Europeans in the population
is around 35%.
It is important to note that our Settlers variable is not capturing the
possibility that European settlement a¤ects corruption through institutional
quality and economic growth (Acemoglu et al. 2001). This is simply because
the level of GDP per capita is controlled for, so our coe¢ cients are capturing
e¤ects that take place independently of economic development12.
Turning to the size of the e¤ect, the coe¢ cients from column 1 imply
that a country with 35% of European settlers in its population during colo-
nial times would be characterized by an e¤ect on the control of corruption
variable of  0:4375. Meanwhile, a country where European settlers became
the totality of the population would enjoy a positive e¤ect of 0:7: These
are large e¤ects, considering that the standard deviation of our dependent
variable is 1:
This initial result may be caused by a bias due to the omission of other
historical factors correlated with the degree of European settlement. We
explore this possibility in the remaining columns of Table 2, where we control
progressively for colonial experience, legal origin, religion and ethnolinguistic
fractionalization.
Colonial experience is probably the rst variable that would come to
mind for correcting an omitted variable bias. Our settlers variable may just
be picking up the fact of having been colonized, which could have conse-
quences for corruption levels independently of settlement patterns. To test
for this possibility we introduce four dummy variables that identify the for-
mer colonies of Britain, France, Spain or Portugal, and any other nation -
the excluded category being the set of non-colonized countries. As the results
12Moreover, the thesis of Acemoglu et al. (2001) would imply a stricly positive e¤ect of
Settlers on absence of corruption instead of the U shaped relationship found here.
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in column 2 show, the relationship between settlers and corruption is little
a¤ected while the identity of the colonial power does not have a statistically
signicant e¤ect on corruption. In short, this result suggest that it is not
just whether a country was colonized or not but the type of colonization as
measured by European settlement that matters13.
In a similar vein, column 3 of Table 2 adds the legal origin of the country
as a control variable. The correlation between legal origin and the identity
of the colonial power is positive but not too high, since many countries
imitated the legal framework of a major European country without there
being a colonial link. This time we nd large positive e¤ects on the con-
trol of corruption, particularly for countries associated with Scandinavian
and German legal traditions (the excluded category being countries with a
Socialist tradition). This does not, however, diminish in any way the exis-
tence of an inverted U pattern between corruption and European settlement:
the coe¢ cients of interest remain almost unchanged.
The last two columns of Table 2 also control for the percentage of the
population professing the Catholic, Muslim and Protestant faith and for eth-
nolinguistic fractionalization. None of these variables presents a statistically
signicant e¤ect on corruption and their coe¢ cients are all very small. The
e¤ect of European settlement, on the other hand, remains large and signif-
icant. Overall, when we examine the results of the last column of Table 2
we notice that, besides European settlement and GDP per capita, the only
variables with a statistically signicant e¤ect on corruption at the 5% level
are the dummy for British colonies and the Scandinavian and German legal
origins (all with a positive e¤ect). The result for British colonies is in line
with the ndings in Treisman (2000), but comes in addition to the role of
European settlement identied here.
13Throughout the paper we use the denition of former colony of other countriesfrom
Treisman (2007) which includes, notably, former republics of the Soviet Union. When we
use an alternative variable that does not count such cases as colonies we obtain essentially
the same results.
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4 Baseline results: instrumentation
Our baseline results may be biased by the potential endogeneity of GDP
per capita, a key determinant of corruption levels. To address this issue we
run a series of regressions where current GDP per capita is instrumented
by di¤erent geographical determinants of economic development or by past
levels of GDP per capita. Table 3 reports both the rst and the second stage
results of these regressions. We include the full list of exogenous control
variables (as in the last column of table 2), but report their coe¢ cients only
for the second stage regression.
The rst three columns of table 3 present the results when the instru-
ment for GDP per capita is, respectively, latitude, risk of malaria transmis-
sion and the fraction of land within 100 km. of the sea. A countrys latitude
is a good indicator of its climate and as a consequence of its suitability
to import agricultural technologies (Diamond 1997, Sachs 2001 ). Regions
a¤ected by malaria present serious di¢ culties for productive work and eco-
nomic progress. Proximity to the sea, nally, will improve the prospects of
integration with the world economy and the gains from trade. These three
geographical factors should have an inuence on current levels of GDP per
capita and no direct inuence on corruption. The fourth column considers
all three geographical instruments together while columns ve and six use
GDP per capita in 1700 and 1820 from Maddison (2003) as an alternative
instrument for current GDP per capita.
The rst stage results show that all the instruments have a statistically
signicant e¤ect on GDP per capita and that their signs are as expected
(positive for latitude and proximity to the sea, negative for risk of malaria).
In addition, the diagnostic tests that appear immediately after the second-
stage results indicate that the ndings do not su¤er from the problem of
weak instruments.
In particular, the relatively large Shea partial R-square values and the
rejection of the Anderson underidentication test (p-value<0.05) point to
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the relevance of the instruments in explaining GDP per capita. To further
check the validity of the instruments, the Stock-Yogo (2005) weak identi-
cation test statistic is reported. Except for the last two columns, where we
instrument GDP per capita with its historical values, we can reject the null
hypothesis that our instruments are weak14. Finally, when we use more than
one instrument, as in column 4, we use the Hansen overidentication J-test
to examine whether the instruments are orthogonal to the error process in
the regression. The high p-value of the test suggests that the geographical
instruments are indeed valid. Given their validity, we opt to use them jointly
for the remainder of our analysis.
Turning to the second stage results, a rst observation from table 3 is
that the e¤ect of GDP per capita is not smaller, and often somewhat larger,
than what was estimated in Table 2 under WLS. As for the e¤ects of settlers
on corruption, all regressions paint a consistent picture of a statistically
signicant inverted U relationship between these two variables. With the
exception of column 5, the coe¢ cients on European settlers and its square
are remarkably consistent across all regressions (between  0:027 and  0:029
for European settlers and between 0:0003 and 0:0004 for its square). Results
for the remaining variables are equally in line with our previous estimates.
5 Robustness checks
Having found consistent support for our thesis in WLS and 2SLS regressions
this section tests the robustness of these results by considering alternative
measures of corruption and by including a large number of alternative de-
terminants of corruption. All regressions include the set of control variables
considered in Table 3 and instrument for GDP per capita using latitude,
risk of malaria and the fraction of land within 100 km. of the sea.
We start by considering di¤erent measures of corruption. While all our
previous results have used the World Bank control of corruption index for
14The 5% critical values of the Stock-Yogo weak identication test with 10% maximal
IV relative bias are 16.38 and 9.08 respectively for one and three instruments.
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2005, Table 4 considers this same index for the years 2004, 2002 and 1998;
the Transparency International index of corruption for 2004, 2002 and 1998;
and the International Country Risk Guide measure for 2003 and 1995. These
additional corruption indicators are also popular in the literature, and all
three of them are typically found to be highly correlated. This is indeed the
case in our sample as their pairwise correlations vary between 0.71 and 0.99.
In all cases we nd the result of a statistically signicant inverted U
relationship between settlers and measures of corruption. If we compare
the estimated coe¢ cients for the di¤erent years of the World Bank index
we note that the magnitude of the e¤ect is actually larger than in our pre-
vious tables, where the World Bank index for 2005 was used15. For the
Transparency International and International Country Risk Guide indexes
the e¤ects are similarly large, with a change in corruption equal to more
than half a standard deviation of the dependent variable when settlers are
35% of the population (based on columns 4 and 7 of table 4)16.
As the literature on the determinants of corruption has become quite
voluminous, a large number of additional control variables can be included
in our regressions. In order to bring additional support to our story we take
them into account in what follows17.
Results are reported in tables 5 and 6, which roughly follow the di¤erent
tests proposed by Treisman (2007). In Table 5 we consider variables that can
be grouped under the heading of political institutions: an index of current
political rights, the number of years under democracy, an index of freedom of
the press, a measure of newspaper circulation, and di¤erent measures of the
15For instance, the coe¢ cients for 1998 ( 0:039 and 0:005) imply an e¤ect on corruption
of  0:7525 when settlers are 35% of the population.
16 It is worth mentioning that results are also robust to the use of corruption indicators
for the rest of the years in Treismans (2007) dataset. These refer to the years 1996 and
2000 for the World Bank index and 2000, 2001, 2003 and 2005 for TI.
17Most of these variables are not obviously related to the degree of European settlement
and their omission would therefore not create any bias, which is why we have not considered
them so far. One more reason for not controlling for them up to this point is their potential
endogeneity with corruption and the lack of good instruments to establish causality.
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type of political and electoral system in place. Among the papers that have
argued for the importance of some of these variables we can cite Montinola
and Jackman (2002), Treisman (2000), Brunetti and Weder (2003), Adsera
et al. (2003), Panizza (2001) and Persson et al. (2003) among many others.
As could be expected, political rights and freedom of the press are both
consistently associated with lower corruption; though the direction of causal-
ity is open to discussion18. For all the other political variables we nd e¤ects
that are not statistically signicant. Our central result, though, proves to
be exceptionally stable to the inclusion of these controls. Both European
settlers and its square are statistically signicant at the 1% level in all re-
gressions and the estimated coe¢ cients vary between  0:023 and  0:030 for
the level and 0:0003 and 0:0004 for its square in most regressions.
A similar outcome is presented in Table 6, where we consider the roles
of being a fuel-exporting country, openness to trade, a measure of state
regulation (time required to open a rm), measures of the importance of
women in the government, hyperination, income inequality and dummies
for Latin America and sub-saharan Africa. The literature has analyzed the
e¤ects of these di¤erent factors on corruption in papers like Dollar et al.
(2001), Swamy et al. (2001), Braun and Di Tella (2004), Van Rijckgehem
and Weder (2001) or Ades and Di Tella (1999).
Once again, some of these variables present a statistically signicant
association with corruption, notably fuel exports, state regulation, the per-
centage of women at ministerial level and a dummy for hyperination. Re-
garding the e¤ects of European settlement, these continue to be robust and
clearly signicant across all regressions. Worthy of notice are the results
reported in column 9, where dummies for Latin America and the Caribbean
and sub-saharan Africa are included. This controls for any omitted charac-
teristic of these regions that could be behind corruption levels and European
18Table 5 does not consider political rights and freedom of the press simultaneously since
both measures come from the same source (Freedom House) and are highly correlated.
We have also used the Polity IV measure of political rights with similar results.
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settlement. As it turns out, these dummies are not statistically signicant
while the e¤ects of European settlement are unchanged. To put it in other
words, Latin America and Africa are not outliers once the e¤ects of Euro-
pean settlement (and all other included regressors) are taken into account.
A similar result is obtained if we instead choose to exclude Latin American
countries from the sample (column 10).
Overall, then, this section has clearly demonstrated the robustness of our
results when controlling for a wealth of additional explanatory factors of cor-
ruption proposed in the literature. As a nal exercise we have tested our
thesis using experienced-based measures of corruption which, as discussed
in the introduction, have no reason to be related to European settlement.
As expected, we nd that for two of these measures (the Global Corrup-
tion Barometer from Transparency International and the World Business
Environment Survey from the World bank) there is no relationship between
settlers and experienced corruption. Results are available upon request.
6 Concluding remarks
In this paper we have argued that corruption in developing countries has
deep historical roots and that colonialism is of paramount importance to its
understanding. While we are clearly not the rst to associate colonialism
with corruption, we do take the literature forward by di¤erentiating colonial
experiences by the degree of European settlement that they brought to the
country. As emphasized by the growing literature on the socioeconomic
e¤ects of colonialism, the degree of European settlement is often of greater
importance than the identity of the colonial power.
The link between European settlement and corruption works through the
formation of local elites, their power and attitudes. More powerful elites are
able to enter in acts of corruption with impunity and the ethnic di¤erences
between them and the rest of the population make a concern for the others
well-being all too unlikely. As we have argued, the power of this European
elite and their capacity to impose measures that would favor them at the
18
expense of the native population can be related to their numbers. The
relationship is non-linear: a larger number of European settlers can solidify
their position of power with respect to the rest of the population, but this is
no longer true if Europeans are so numerous that they become the majority
of the population. We would therefore expect that corruption rst increases
and then decreases with the degree of European settlement.
Our results present convincing evidence that the above thesis holds in
practice. Controlling for level of development and a set of exogenous de-
terminants of corruption we nd that the degree of European settlement
is a powerful explanatory factor of corruption and that the relationship is
non-linear. The result continues to hold in a large number of robustness
tests where we instrument for economic development, consider alternative
measures of corruption, and add a large number of additional explanatory
factors of corruption found in the literature.
Overall, then, this paper contributes to our understanding of why cor-
ruption is so pervasive in some societies and to our growing awareness of the
implications of colonial experience on developing countries up to this day.
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Figure 1 
Control of Corruption and European Settlement 
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Table 1 
Summary Statistics 
 Mean Std Dev Min Max Obs 
World Bank control of corruption index (2005) -0.0003 0.999 -1.79 2.49 204 
GDP per capita (log) 8.54 1.15 6.35 11.02 163 
Former British colony 0.327 0.469 0 1 200 
Former French colony 0.158 0.404 0 1 202 
Former Spanish or Portuguese colony 0.155 0.362 0 1 200 
Former colony of other countries 0.229 0.419 0 1 203 
British legal origin 0.342 0.475 0 1 184 
French legal origin 0.445 0.498 0 1 184 
Scandinavian legal origin 0.027 0.163 0 1 184 
German legal origin 0.027 0.163 0 1 184 
Protestant 13.19 21.31 0 97.8 184 
Catholic 31.13 35.67 0 99.1 187 
Muslim 23.21 35.77 0 99.9 187 
Ethnolingusitic fractionalization 0.458 0.272 0 0.98 171 
      
European settlers 6.29 16.20 0 98.6 156 
      
Note: The source of the dataset is Treisman (2007). European settlers are from Angeles and Neanidis (2009). 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 
Benchmark Findings 
 Dependent variable: World Bank control of corruption index (2005) 
 (1) 
WLS 
(2) 
WLS 
(3) 
WLS 
(4) 
WLS 
(5) 
WLS 
GDP per capita (log) 0.709 
(0.000) 
0.724 
(0.000) 
0.652 
(0.000) 
0.633 
(0.000) 
0.636 
(0.000) 
Former British colony  0.158 
(0.383) 
0.308 
(0.045) 
0.294 
(0.070) 
0.362 
(0.019) 
Former French colony  0.128 
(0.491) 
0.294 
(0.081) 
0.238 
(0.138) 
0.234 
(0.146) 
Former Spanish or Portuguese 
colony 
 0.029 
(0.903) 
0.210 
(0.392) 
0.174 
(0.474) 
0.142 
(0.570) 
Former colony of other countries  -0.213 
(0.212) 
0.188 
(0.291) 
0.114 
(0.555) 
0.104 
(0.588) 
British legal origin   0.348 
(0.064) 
0.225 
(0.306) 
0.161 
(0.467) 
French legal origin   0.303 
(0.021) 
0.310 
(0.065) 
0.309 
(0.076) 
Scandinavian legal origin   1.53 
(0.000) 
1.00 
(0.006) 
1.01 
(0.006) 
German legal origin   0.918 
(0.013) 
0.811 
(0.028) 
0.788 
(0.030) 
Protestant    0.006 
(0.089) 
0.006 
(0.107) 
Catholic    -0.001 
(0.911) 
0.001 
(0.908) 
Muslim    -0.001 
(0.689) 
-0.001 
(0.619) 
Ethnolingusitic fractionalization     0.002 
(0.989) 
      
European settlers -0.023 
(0.001) 
-0.027 
(0.005) 
-0.024 
(0.019) 
-0.025 
(0.009) 
-0.026 
(0.009) 
European settlers squared 0.0003 
(0.000) 
0.0004 
(0.001) 
0.0003 
(0.001) 
0.0003 
(0.001) 
0.0004 
(0.001) 
      
Countries  142 139 132 130 128 
R-square 0.741 0.752 0.811 0.817 0.821 
Implied settlement threshold (%) 34.96 38.34 35.80 36.77 37.45 
Notes: Dependent variable is the World Bank control of corruption index (2005) which measures the absence of 
corruption. Regressions based on Weighted Least Squares (WLS). p-values in parentheses based on White-corrected 
standard errors, weighted by the inverse of the standard error. Constant term not reported.  
 
 
Table 3 
Benchmark Findings: Two-stage least squares 
 Second stage results 
Dependent variable: World Bank control of corruption index (2005) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
GDP per capita (log) 0.840 
(0.000) 
0.737 
(0.000) 
0.601 
(0.000) 
0.721 
(0.000) 
1.19 
(0.000) 
0.894 
(0.001) 
Former British colony 0.390 
(0.020) 
0.395 
(0.009) 
0.375 
(0.008) 
0.393 
(0.009) 
0.734 
(0.042) 
0.450 
(0.064) 
Former French colony 0.414 
(0.025) 
0.329 
(0.044) 
0.210 
(0.239) 
0.315 
(0.048) 
0.866 
(0.003) 
0.352 
(0.070) 
Former Spanish or Portuguese 
colony 
0.339 
(0.202) 
0.270 
(0.256) 
0.153 
(0.540) 
0.256 
(0.278) 
0.792 
(0.006) 
0.328 
(0.384) 
Former colony of other power 
except Spain or Portugal 
0.182 
(0.323) 
0.135 
(0.465) 
0.069 
(0.728) 
0.127 
(0.492) 
0.316 
(0.075) 
-0.097 
(0.654) 
British legal origin 0.187 
(0.402) 
0.179 
(0.408) 
0.147 
(0.498) 
0.175 
(0.415) 
-0.371 
(0.496) 
0.318 
(0.428) 
French legal origin 0.245 
(0.208) 
0.271 
(0.123) 
0.297 
(0.066) 
0.274 
(0.113) 
-0.517 
(0.142) 
0.178 
(0.606) 
Scandinavian legal origin 0.854 
(0.004) 
0.897 
(0.004) 
0.993 
(0.005) 
0.908 
(0.004) 
0.298 
(0.364) 
1.00 
(0.056) 
German legal origin 0.596 
(0.091) 
0.686 
(0.045) 
0.812 
(0.016) 
0.701 
(0.037) 
0.240 
(0.406) 
0.679 
(0.098) 
Protestant 0.005 
(0.120) 
0.006 
(0.073) 
0.006 
(0.073) 
0.006 
(0.070) 
0.004 
(0.580) 
0.005 
(0.328) 
Catholic -0.001 
(0.662) 
-0.001 
(0.806) 
0.001 
(0.948) 
-0.001 
(0.834) 
-0.001 
(0.748) 
0.001 
(0.749) 
Muslim -0.001 
(0.785) 
-0.001 
(0.641) 
-0.001 
(0.537) 
-0.001 
(0.627) 
0.005 
(0.250) 
0.001 
(0.714) 
Ethnolingusitic division 0.355 
(0.161) 
0.179 
(0.379) 
-0.051 
(0.834) 
0.152 
(0.438) 
0.597 
(0.141) 
0.336 
(0.464) 
       
European settlers -0.029 
(0.002) 
-0.028 
(0.001) 
-0.027 
(0.004) 
-0.028 
(0.001) 
-0.044 
(0.002) 
-0.028 
(0.042) 
European settlers squared 0.0003 
(0.001) 
0.0004 
(0.000) 
0.0004 
(0.000) 
0.0003 
(0.000) 
0.0005 
(0.008) 
0.0003 
(0.024) 
       
Countries  128 123 123 123 27 46 
Number of Instruments 1 1 1 3 1 1 
R-squared (centered) 0.796 0.815 0.821 0.816 0.947 0.877 
Shea partial R-square 0.238 0.387 0.204 0.474 0.227 0.162 
Anderson test (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.101 
Stock-Yogo F-statistic 27.06 47.34 25.60 32.04 3.49 4.12 
Hansen J-test (p-value) - - - 0.340 - - 
Implied settlement threshold (%) 42.64 40.70 37.25 40.28 49.13 45.12 
       
 
 
 First stage results 
Dependent variable: GDP per capita (log) 
Latitude 0.036 
(0.000) 
  0.019 
(0.018) 
  
Risk of malaria transmission   -1.97 
(0.000) 
 -1.09 
(0.005) 
  
Fraction of land area within 
100km of sea cost  
  1.15 
(0.000) 
0.789 
(0.000) 
  
GDP per capita in 1700     0.001 
(0.089) 
 
GDP per capita in 1820      0.001 
(0.051) 
All other exogenous regressors  
 
included included included included included included 
R-squared (centered) 0.644 0.717 0.633 0.757 0.905 0.741 
Notes: Dependent variable is the World Bank control of corruption index (2005) which measures the absence of corruption. 
Regressions based on 2SLS. p-values in parentheses based on White-corrected standard errors, weighted by the inverse of the 
standard error. Constant term not reported. Instrumented variables are in bold type. The lower panel of the table reports the 
coefficient estimates of the excluded instruments from the first-stage regressions. 
Table 4 
Alternative Measures of (Control of) Corruption 
 Dependent variable: various corruption indicators 
 World Bank Transparency International ICRG 
 (1) 
2004 
(2) 
2002 
(3) 
1998 
(4) 
2004 
(5) 
2002 
(6) 
1998 
(7) 
2003 
(8) 
1995 
GDP per capita (log) 0.689 
(0.000) 
0.728 
(0.000) 
0.734 
(0.000) 
1.37 
(0.000) 
1.62 
(0.000) 
1.75 
(0.000) 
0.464 
(0.002) 
0.853 
(0.000) 
Former British colony 0.427 
(0.003) 
0.354 
(0.024) 
0.439 
(0.010) 
0.963 
(0.010) 
1.04 
(0.029) 
1.79 
(0.000) 
0.653 
(0.025) 
0.716 
(0.120) 
Former French colony 0.313 
(0.041) 
0.380 
(0.026) 
0.161 
(0.367) 
0.688 
(0.028) 
0.602 
(0.116) 
1.38 
(0.000) 
0.528 
(0.090) 
0.546 
(0.077) 
Former Spanish or Portuguese 
colony 
0.217 
(0.384) 
0.333 
(0.209) 
0.199 
(0.499) 
0.977 
(0.149) 
0.670 
(0.406) 
1.32 
(0.044) 
0.904 
(0.037) 
1.00 
(0.034) 
Former colony of other power 
except Spain or Portugal 
0.050 
(0.810) 
0.070 
(0.740) 
-0.216 
(0.316) 
-0.075 
(0.872) 
-0.206 
(0.643) 
-0.453 
(0.258) 
-0.058 
(0.837) 
-0.164 
(0.511) 
British legal origin 0.171 
(0.448) 
0.258 
(0.256) 
0.046 
(0.842) 
0.085 
(0.875) 
-0.153 
(0.799) 
-0.386 
(0.519) 
-0.229 
(0.555) 
-1.60 
(0.006) 
French legal origin 0.323 
(0.090) 
0.317 
(0.134) 
0.003 
(0.986) 
0.180 
(0.707) 
-0.098 
(0.868) 
-0.772 
(0.160) 
-0.072 
(0.818) 
-1.33 
(0.009) 
Scandinavian legal origin 1.02 
(0.004) 
1.00 
(0.004) 
0.839 
(0.026) 
2.22 
(0.003) 
1.63 
(0.023) 
1.10 
(0.145) 
2.33 
(0.000) 
-0.724 
(0.180) 
German legal origin 0.671 
(0.104) 
0.603 
(0.080) 
0.308 
(0.398) 
1.49 
(0.083) 
0.740 
(0.264) 
0.089 
(0.877) 
1.10 
(0.012) 
-0.318 
(0.439) 
Protestant 0.006 
(0.063) 
0.005 
(0.135) 
0.006 
(0.069) 
0.016 
(0.022) 
0.017 
(0.012) 
0.028 
(0.001) 
0.006 
(0.258) 
0.011 
(0.031) 
Catholic 0.001 
(0.824) 
-0.001 
(0.904) 
0.001 
(0.486) 
-0.001 
(0.915) 
-0.001 
(0.927) 
0.007 
(0.042) 
0.002 
(0.499) 
-0.007 
(0.109) 
Muslim -0.001 
(0.478) 
-0.001 
(0.520) 
-0.001 
(0.744) 
-0.002 
(0.476) 
0.002 
(0.689) 
0.004 
(0.353) 
-0.001 
(0.858) 
-0.002 
(0.554) 
Ethnolingusitic division 0.048 
(0.816) 
0.055 
(0.793) 
-0.012 
(0.949) 
0.260 
(0.620) 
0.670 
(0.218) 
0.371 
(0.530) 
0.319 
(0.415) 
0.548 
(0.324) 
         
European settlers -0.030 
(0.001) 
-0.039 
(0.000) 
-0.039 
(0.000) 
-0.072 
(0.003) 
-0.056 
(0.054) 
-0.082 
(0.002) 
-0.047 
(0.012) 
-0.042 
(0.011) 
European settlers squared 0.0004 
(0.000) 
0.0005 
(0.000) 
0.0005 
(0.000) 
0.0009 
(0.000) 
0.0007 
(0.014) 
0.0009 
(0.002) 
0.0006 
(0.001) 
0.0005 
(0.008) 
         
Countries 123 124 123 112 88 73 108 98 
R-square (centered) 0.811 0.793 0.818 0.815 0.837 0.843 0.650 0.574 
Shea partial R-square 0.474 0.464 0.438 0.442 0.498 0.541 0.464 0.419 
Anderson test (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.032 0.000 
Stock-Yogo F-statistic 32.04 31.66 26.94 22.87 24.77 20.40 22.28 13.56 
Hansen J-test (p-value) 0.588 0.669 0.258 0.486 0.929 0.789 0.694 0.081 
Implied settlement threshold (%) 38.99 41.64 41.83 38.79 38.95 46.26 36.80 43.72 
 Notes: Dependent variable is the World Bank (WB) control of corruption index, the Transparency International (TI) corruption perception index, and the International Country Risk Guide 
(ICRG) corruption index, all in various years. All indexes measure absence of corruption. p-values in parentheses based on White-corrected standard errors, weighted by the inverse of the 
standard error. Constant term not reported. Instrumented variables are in bold type. Regressions based on 2SLS with all three instruments as in Table 2, column (8). The year of the initial 
GDP per capita is always lagged compared to the year of the dependent variable (for instance, for the corruption indices of the year 2002, the year of GDP refers to 1999). 
 
Table 5 
Accounting for Political Institutions 
 Dependent variable: World Bank control of corruption index (2005) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
GDP per capita (log) 0.561 
(0.000) 
0.550 
(0.000) 
0.511 
(0.000) 
0.528 
(0.000) 
0.541 
(0.000) 
0.474 
(0.000) 
0.554 
(0.000) 
0.749 
(0.000) 
0.529 
(0.000) 
0.764 
(0.000) 
Former British colony 0.382 
(0.015) 
0.397 
(0.011) 
0.364 
(0.024) 
0.374 
(0.017) 
0.370 
(0.019) 
0.323 
(0.037) 
0.383 
(0.016) 
-0.223 
(0.352) 
0.364 
(0.019) 
0.400 
(0.017) 
Former French colony 0.283 
(0.039) 
0.288 
(0.035) 
0.267 
(0.044) 
0.269 
(0.053) 
0.216 
(0.128) 
0.217 
(0.137) 
0.239 
(0.088) 
0.587 
(0.000) 
0.192 
(0.174) 
 
Former Spanish or Portuguese 
colony 
0.120 
(0.615) 
0.147 
(0.526) 
0.112 
(0.616) 
0.111 
(0.634) 
0.139 
(0.543) 
0.080 
(0.756) 
0.178 
(0.431) 
0.601 
(0.037) 
0.116 
(0.612) 
0.705 
(0.032) 
Former colony of other power 
except Spain or Portugal 
-0.020 
(0.911) 
0.002 
(0.992) 
-0.019 
(0.909) 
-0.019 
(0.914) 
0.010 
(0.951) 
-0.042 
(0.826) 
-0.005 
(0.976) 
0.008 
(0.961) 
-0.021 
(0.903) 
0.104 
(0.574) 
British legal origin 0.002 
(0.993) 
0.032 
(0.888) 
-0.040 
(0.868) 
-0.022 
(0.929) 
0.043 
(0.850) 
0.042 
(0.857) 
0.013 
(0.955) 
0.550 
(0.006) 
0.021 
(0.925) 
-0.186 
(0.557) 
French legal origin 0.152 
(0.384) 
0.180 
(0.289) 
0.130 
(0.438) 
0.144 
(0.401) 
0.200 
(0.230) 
0.153 
(0.369) 
0.156 
(0.369) 
-0.159 
(0.411) 
0.170 
(0.298) 
-0.212 
(0.482) 
Scandinavian legal origin 0.873 
(0.007) 
0.912 
(0.004) 
0.728 
(0.042) 
0.798 
(0.018) 
0.822 
(0.014) 
0.527 
(0.168) 
0.804 
(0.015) 
0.451 
(0.069) 
0.818 
(0.017) 
0.787 
(0.006) 
German legal origin 0.604 
(0.041) 
0.627 
(0.030) 
0.566 
(0.046) 
0.618 
(0.029) 
0.583 
(0.067) 
0.346 
(0.360) 
0.558 
(0.072) 
0.322 
(0.276) 
0.639 
(0.060) 
0.772 
(0.001) 
Protestant 0.005 
(0.119) 
0.004 
(0.164) 
0.005 
(0.103) 
0.005 
(0.120) 
0.004 
(0.265) 
0.004 
(0.194) 
0.003 
(0.291) 
0.006 
(0.064) 
0.004 
(0.271) 
0.002 
(0.728) 
Catholic 0.001 
(0.934) 
-0.001 
(0.920) 
-0.001 
(0.984) 
-0.001 
(0.993) 
-0.001 
(0.638) 
0.001 
(0.952) 
-0.001 
(0.575) 
0.001 
(0.902) 
-0.001 
(0.841) 
-0.001 
(0.675) 
Muslim 0.001 
(0.385) 
0.001 
(0.425) 
0.002 
(0.303) 
0.001 
(0.370) 
0.001 
(0.574) 
0.002 
(0.196) 
0.001 
(0.523) 
0.003 
(0.055) 
0.001 
(0.435) 
0.002 
(0.470) 
Ethnolingusitic division 0.014 
(0.938) 
0.039 
(0.819) 
-0.031 
(0.875) 
-0.016 
(0.930) 
-0.044 
(0.807) 
-0.047 
(0.814) 
0.007 
(0.969) 
0.680 
(0.022) 
-0.043 
(0.820) 
0.576 
(0.210) 
           
European settlers -0.028 
(0.001) 
-0.026 
(0.002) 
-0.027 
(0.001) 
-0.025 
(0.001) 
-0.025 
(0.004) 
-0.023 
(0.013) 
-0.024 
(0.006) 
-0.042 
(0.000) 
-0.025 
(0.005) 
-0.036 
(0.000) 
European settlers squared 0.0004 
(0.000) 
0.0003 
(0.000) 
0.0003 
(0.000) 
0.0003 
(0.000) 
0.0003 
(0.000) 
0.0003 
(0.002) 
0.0003 
(0.001) 
0.0005 
(0.000) 
0.0003 
(0.000) 
0.0004 
(0.000) 
           
Political rights  -0.112 
(0.000) 
-0.224 
(0.115) 
-0.106 
(0.001) 
-0.110 
(0.000) 
      
Political rights squared  0.014 
(0.363) 
        
Democratic since 1930 (number 
of years) 
  0.004 
(0.376) 
       
Democratic since 1950 (dummy)    0.146 
(0.387) 
      
Freedom of press     0.011 
(0.000) 
0.011 
(0.000) 
0.011 
(0.000) 
0.013 
(0.000) 
0.011 
(0.000) 
0.013 
(0.006) 
Newspaper circulation 1996      0.001 
(0.318) 
    
Presidential democracy       -0.011 
(0.792) 
   
Pure plurality system        0.032 
(0.799) 
  
Open-list system        -0.078 
(0.449) 
  
District magnitude        -0.002 
(0.317) 
  
Open-list * District magnitude        -0.003 
(0.714) 
  
Federation         -0.136 
(0.259) 
 
Fiscal decentralization          -0.001 
(0.797) 
Countries  123 123 123 123 123 117 122 63 123 50 
R-square (centered) 0.847 0.848 0.849 0.848 0.852 0.854 0.852 0.923 0.853 0.921 
Shea partial R-square 0.382 0.375 0.298 0.335 0.365 0.266 0.342 0.318 0.379 0.251 
Anderson test (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Stock-Yogo F-statistic 17.88 17.29 13.92 15.53 17.57 10.68 15.96 3.97 17.65 3.74 
Hansen J-test (p-value) 0.226 0.199 0.298 0.295 0.123 0.147 0.105 0.466 0.054 0.741 
Implied settlement threshold (%) 38.95 39.12 39.33 38.79 38.72 38.39 38.99 44.83 37.37 42.89 
Notes: Dependent variable is the World Bank control of corruption index (2005) which measures the absence of corruption. p-values in parentheses based on White-corrected 
standard errors, weighted by the inverse of the standard error. Constant term not reported. Instrumented variables are in bold type. Regressions based on 2SLS with all three 
instruments as in Table 2, column (8). In column (11) Former French colony is dropped due to collinearities. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6 
Controlling for Rents, State Regulation, Market Competition, Gender, Inflation, and Other Factors 
 Dependent variable: World Bank control of corruption index (2005) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
GDP per capita (log) 0.767 
(0.000) 
0.776 
(0.000) 
0.593 
(0.000) 
0.763 
(0.000) 
0.840 
(0.000) 
0.849 
(0.000) 
0.821 
(0.000) 
0.818 
(0.000) 
0.876 
(0.000) 
0.758 
(0.000) 
Former British colony 0.408 
(0.004) 
0.552 
(0.000) 
0.519 
(0.002) 
0.449 
(0.002) 
0.537 
(0.000) 
0.540 
(0.000) 
0.475 
(0.001) 
0.682 
(0.000) 
0.413 
(0.002) 
0.477 
(0.001) 
Former French colony 0.342 
(0.051) 
0.518 
(0.004) 
0.427 
(0.005) 
0.358 
(0.048) 
0.480 
(0.006) 
0.502 
(0.005) 
0.452 
(0.011) 
0.478 
(0.004) 
0.405 
(0.026) 
0.373 
(0.034) 
Former Spanish or Portuguese 
colony 
0.291 
(0.324) 
0.418 
(0.137) 
0.159 
(0.651) 
0.250 
(0.375) 
0.450 
(0.096) 
0.499 
(0.088) 
0.384 
(0.177) 
0.315 
(0.291) 
0.427 
(0.145) 
0.273 
(0.385) 
Former colony of other power 
except Spain or Portugal 
-0.058 
(0.687) 
-0.035 
(0.812) 
-0.041 
(0.793) 
0.043 
(0.758) 
-0.035 
(0.764) 
-0.014 
(0.918) 
0.013 
(0.929) 
0.030 
(0.848) 
0.026 
(0.866) 
-0.015 
(0.918) 
British legal origin -0.213 
(0.259) 
-0.304 
(0.151) 
-0.268 
(0.230) 
-0.076 
(0.700) 
-0.183 
(0.304) 
-0.218 
(0.240) 
-0.135 
(0.504) 
-0.353 
(0.081) 
-0.185 
(0.338) 
-0.133 
(0.513) 
French legal origin -0.049 
(0.794) 
-0.183 
(0.378) 
0.229 
(0.234) 
0.058 
(0.768) 
-0.081 
(0.676) 
-0.101 
(0.604) 
-0.034 
(0.860) 
-0.040 
(0.837) 
-0.146 
(0.446) 
-0.033 
(0.855) 
Scandinavian legal origin 0.818 
(0.002) 
0.738 
(0.014) 
0.813 
(0.055) 
0.706 
(0.004) 
0.533 
(0.021) 
0.574 
(0.034) 
0.849 
(0.001) 
0.920 
(0.001) 
0.780 
(0.001) 
0.665 
(0.009) 
German legal origin 0.509 
(0.061) 
0.367 
(0.192) 
0.593 
(0.050) 
0.509 
(0.041) 
0.392 
(0.058) 
0.367 
(0.080) 
0.451 
(0.102) 
0.477 
(0.087) 
0.377 
(0.178) 
0.456 
(0.082) 
Protestant 0.007 
(0.006) 
0.006 
(0.018) 
0.006 
(0.209) 
0.005 
(0.048) 
0.005 
(0.049) 
0.004 
(0.100) 
0.006 
(0.050) 
0.005 
(0.070) 
0.005 
(0.051) 
0.009 
(0.002) 
Catholic 0.001 
(0.503) 
0.001 
(0.617) 
0.001 
(0.467) 
0.001 
(0.905) 
0.001 
(0.754) 
0.001 
(0.921) 
0.001 
(0.857) 
0.001 
(0.609) 
0.001 
(0.888) 
0.001 
(0.492) 
Muslim 0.003 
(0.028) 
0.003 
(0.109) 
-0.001 
(0.487) 
0.003 
(0.085) 
0.004 
(0.045) 
0.003 
(0.152) 
0.003 
(0.153) 
0.002 
(0.252) 
0.004 
(0.022) 
0.003 
(0.067) 
Ethnolingusitic division 0.464 
(0.041) 
0.485 
(0.056) 
0.364 
(0.184) 
0.394 
(0.083) 
0.578 
(0.011) 
0.613 
(0.011) 
0.460 
(0.042) 
0.574 
(0.019) 
0.455 
(0.055) 
0.320 
(0.153) 
           
European settlers -0.023 
(0.028) 
-0.024 
(0.037) 
-0.029 
(0.045) 
-0.022 
(0.023) 
-0.031 
(0.001) 
-0.033 
(0.000) 
-0.026 
(0.014) 
-0.027 
(0.029) 
-0.023 
(0.058) 
-0.028 
(0.018) 
European settlers squared 0.0003 
(0.004) 
0.0003 
(0.014) 
0.0003 
(0.042) 
0.0003 
(0.006) 
0.0003 
(0.000) 
0.0004 
(0.000) 
0.0003 
(0.004) 
0.0003 
(0.009) 
0.0003 
(0.017) 
0.0003 
(0.003) 
           
Fuel exports -0.008 
(0.000) 
-0.008 
(0.000) 
-0.008 
(0.000) 
-0.008 
(0.000) 
-0.008 
(0.000) 
-0.008 
(0.000) 
-0.008 
(0.000) 
-0.008 
(0.000) 
-0.009 
(0.000) 
-0.008 
(0.000) 
Imports (% of GDP) 0.002 
(0.434) 
         
Year opened to trade  -0.003 
(0.642) 
        
Time required to open firm (log)   -0.229 
(0.020) 
       
Women in lower house of 
parliament (%) 
   0.010 
(0.098) 
0.001 
(0.852) 
-0.002 
(0.795) 
    
Women in government at 
ministerial level (%) 
    0.010 
(0.007) 
0.012 
(0.004) 
    
Government party’s margin of 
victory 
     0.112 
(0.720) 
    
Fractionalization of parties      0.253 
(0.409) 
    
Hyperinflation dummy        -0.491 
(0.000) 
   
Inequality (Gini, 2004)        0.002 
(0.729) 
  
Dummy for Latin America         0.042 
(0.907) 
 
Dummy for Sub-Saharan Africa         0.242 
(0.233) 
 
Countries  104 96 72 105 88 86 102 96 105 87 
R-square (centered) 0.861 0.859 0.870 0.857 0.885 0.888 0.854 0.857 0.849 0.880 
Shea partial R-square 0.409 0.385 0.522 0.429 0.462 0.451 0.453 0.448 0.281 0.485 
Anderson test (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Stock-Yogo F-statistic 17.04 13.06 15.67 21.58 18.79 17.93 21.30 19.47 9.98 16.22 
Hansen J-test (p-value) 0.087 0.824 0.500 0.803 0.932 0.981 0.618 0.912 0.676 0.139 
Implied settlement threshold (%) 37.95 40.67 45.91 39.98 45.02 44.80 41.00 41.44 39.72 41.36 
Notes: Dependent variable is the World Bank control of corruption index (2005) which measures the absence of corruption. p-values in parentheses based on White-
corrected standard errors, weighted by the inverse of the standard error. Constant term not reported. Instrumented variables are in bold type. Regressions based on 2SLS 
with all three instruments as in Table 2, column (8). 
 
